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Pitfalls of Over-Legalization: When the Law
Crowds Out and Spills Over
MARK

T.

KAwAKAMI*

ABSTRACT

While some academics argue that enforcing voluntary corporate
codes of conduct with private law backed sanctions can improve the
working conditions of marginalized workers in the global supply chain,
there are various risks associated with this "legalization"process.
Relying on evidence from the fields of sociology, psychology, and
evolutionary anthropology, this contribution will discuss how external
incentives like threats of legal sanctions can actually be detrimental to
the intrinsic motivations of companies that want to be socially
responsible. This paper will also analyze how the crowding out effect and
the spillover effect that come with legalizing otherwise voluntary norms
could lead to a series of unintended and harmful consequences. In light
of these realizations, this paper will caution against taking codes of
conduct "too seriously" and propose that rather than focusing on legal
sanctions to threaten companies into compliance, a more facilitative
approach based on collaboration,mutual respect, and social norms could
better serve to improve the working conditions of laborers in the bottom
echelons of our supply chain.
INTRODUCTION

Our general reliance on private law to either complement or
substitute public law in order to reduce labor exploitations in the global
supply chain comes from a certain lack of faith in public law to fully
address the problem.' Skeptics and realists alike are alarmed by the fact

* PhD Researcher at the Maastricht European Private Law Institute, Maastricht
University. Special thanks to Jan Smits, Anna Beckers, Anna Berlee, Daniel On, and
Caroline Calomme for their comments during the drafting of this contribution.
1. RICHARD M. LocKE, THE PROMISE AND LIMITS OF PRIVATE POWER: PROMOTING

LABOR STANDARDS IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 169 (2013) (observing that "labor laws and
regulations are often violated, and the labor inspectorates/ministries charged with
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that traditional public law enforcement measures in our perpetually
globalizing world are not particularly well suited to deal with a
collective action problem that has metastasized across borders. 2 Some
even believe that there is an inherent "mismatch between the 'highly
legalistic' and rigid enforcement practices of government regulatory
agencies and the dynamic and evolving reality of supply chain
factories." 3 This mismatch is exacerbated in the global context by the
fact that there is a noticeable "void"4 in international governance as no
governing body is currently capable of dealing with the problem of
companies operating seamlessly across borders and circumventing
national laws, "[tihe emergence of global supply chains .

.

. has rendered

these national and international strategies inadequate because
authority is dispersed not only across national regimes but also among
global buyers and their myriad suppliers." 5
While private actors and private laws cannot completely substitute
for governments and public laws, private actors have the potential to
assist the governments in ultimately reducing the problem of labor
exploitation in the global supply chain. Fortunately, many global brands
have already "acknowledged a degree of responsibility for workplace
conditions in supplier factories" and are spending capital and resources
"developing ever more comprehensive monitoring tools, hiring growing
numbers of internal compliance specialists, conducting hundreds of
factory audits, and working with external consultants and
[nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)]"6 in order to improve the
working conditions of marginalized workers around the globe. While a
galvanized private sector has the potential to make meaningful changes
possible, there are reasons for us to curb our collective enthusiasm as
well. For example, MIT's Richard Locke and his research team
conducted extensive research by studying the supply chain of companies
like Nike and concluded that the results of their corporate social
responsibility (CSR) measures were-at best-mixed. 7 Based on his

inspecting workplaces and enforcing labor laws are weak, underfunded, and at times,
prone to politicization or even corruption").
2. See JAN M. SMITS, PRIVATE LAW 2.0: ON THE ROLE OF PRIVATE ACTORS IN A POST-

NATIONAL SOCIETY 5 (2011) (suggesting in his inaugural lecture that private law, in an of
itself, may also be "no longer fit for purpose and therefore needs to change").
3. LOCKE, supranote 1, at 169.
4. Id. at 9 (noting that "[iut is in this context that private initiatives have emerged to
fill this regulatory void").
5. Id.
6. Id. at 1, 20.
7. Id. at 18 (noting that while the team observed some mixed improvements in
workplace safety and hours after the implementation of codes of conduct, enabling rights
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team's comprehensive analysis, Locke speculates that CSR measures
and their improvements have not only "hit a ceiling," but that the
improvements that the CSR measures have been able to achieve
"appear to be unstable in the sense that many factories cycle in and out
8
of compliance over time."

This brings us to the present situation and the main focus of this
contribution, which is the question of how private actors should proceed
when implementing and enforcing CSR measures in light of these
observations. Anna Beckers recently answered this question by focusing
particularly on the private legal enforcement of otherwise voluntary
corporate codes. 9 Beckers, among others, advocates not only for
companies to contractually impose corporate codes on their downstream
suppliers, but also argues that consumers, NGOs, and even downstream
suppliers ought to rely on private law instruments to hold brands such
as Nike and Apple accountable, even if their corporate codes were never
intended to be legally binding promises to the public.10
While Beckers focuses predominantly on the external relationship
between the buyer-the Nikes of the world-and the consumers, NGOs,
and so forth, this contribution will pay attention to the relationship
between the buyer and its downstream suppliers for two reasons: First,
most egregious labor exploitations often take place at the
supplier/manufacturer level, such as at the factories of Yue Yuen,
Foxconn, and Li & Fung, and not necessarily at companies like Nike,
Wal-Mart, and Apple. One could assume that if we focus our attention
on the major brands, they will eventually stop doing business with these

such as the right to free association and to collectively bargain were still "outside the
pale").
8. Id. at 174.
9. See generally ANNA BECKERS, ENFORCING CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
CODES: ON GLOBAL SELF-REGULATION AND NATIONAL PRIVATE LAW (2015) (focusing on the

characteristics of corporate social responsibility codes, their effects on society, and their
legal consequences in order to provide a comprehensive analysis of corporate codes and the
law).
10. See id. at 217-363 (detailing the various private law instruments that can be
utilized to enforce these codes, including, but not limited to, negligence, contract with
protective effect vis-A-vis third parties, and unfair commercial practices). See also Fabrizio
Cafaggi, Enforcing Transnational Private Regulation: Models and Patterns, in
ENFORCEMENT OF TRANSNATIONAL

REGULATION: ENSURING COMPLIANCE IN A GLOBAL

WORLD 75 (Fabrizio Cafaggi ed., 2012); Doreen McBarnet, CorporateSocial Responsibility
Beyond Law, Through Law, for Law: The New Corporate Accountability, in THE NEW
CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY: CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE LAW 9 (Doreen

McBarnet et al. eds., 2007) (observing the various pros and cons of enhanced corporate
social responsibility measures); ANDREAS RIHMKORF, CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY,

PRIVATE LAW AND GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAINS (2015) (noting the role of private law in
corporate social responsibility and how it can be improved).
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dubious suppliers and manufacturers or, more optimistically, that the
brands will work to increase their due diligence by conducting more
audits and shifting their liabilities downstream. However, focusing on
the brands often does not create the necessary impact CSR advocates
often claim that it will, especially when relying only on extrinsic
motivators.
Second, even if the brands decide to be more socially responsible,
there is no guarantee that the decision to do so will actually impact the
working conditions of the marginalized workers. For example, De Beers,
a diamond company that once controlled about 80 percent of the world's
diamond sales, decided in the 1990s to get out of the "blood diamond"
business and to "market only those it dug up itself" after receiving bad
publicity for its mining practices." Not only did De Beers's position in
the market drop significantly as a result of this "socially responsible"
decision, but De Beers's withdrawal unfortunately did not affect the
working conditions of the miners as the void left by De Beers's exit was
quickly filled by its competitors who did not mind dealing with "blood
diamonds." So. even if we were to concede that the threat of legal
sanctions based on private law might compel the brands to change their
behavior, this change alone does not automatically produce the level of
impact that is necessary to actually improve the working conditions of
marginalized workers.
While there are minor points to nitpick from Beckers's core
arguments-essentially highlighting the benefits of private law
enforcement of otherwise voluntary CSR codes against the brands-it
must be said that her arguments are not entirely unconvincing as they
clearly highlight various benefits of "taking corporate codes seriously"
and targeting the Nikes of the world to be more accountable. The focus
of this article, however, is not to dwell on these apparent benefits or
their viability, but to note that enforcing otherwise voluntary corporate
codes, or to "legalize" corporate codes, could actually be detrimental in
some ways to the process of reducing labor exploitations in the global
supply chain. This is to suggest that while holding companies liable and
keeping them to their promises is, in and of itself, an admirable goal,
doing so does not necessarily improve the working conditions of the
marginalized workers.12
In regard to structure, this Article will first differentiate extrinsic
incentives from intrinsic incentives, legal norms from social norms, as
well as show how differently they each influence our commitment to
11. Betting on De Beers, THE ECONOMIST (Nov. 12, 2011) http://www.economist.com/
node/21538145.
12. Admittedly, this is a rather instrumental understanding of the law, which, for the
time being, overlooks its more normative functions.
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social responsibility. Second, this contribution will highlight the
potential drawbacks-such as the spillover effect and the crowding out
effect-that can emerge from focusing too much on legal or extrinsic
incentives by borrowing examples from a wide variety of fields,
and evolutionary
psychology,
behavioral
sociology,
including
anthropology. Lastly, this contribution will propose that not legally
enforcing the otherwise voluntary codes of conduct can create an
opportunity for collaboration and the chance for all of the parties
involved to reaffirm their commitment to making meaningful and
sustainable changes. The ultimate objective of this contribution is not
necessarily to prevent consumers from suing the Nikes of the world or to
stop Nike from contractually enforcing their corporate codes against
their suppliers. The objective here is merely to increase awareness of
some latent repercussions that can arise from such lawsuits and to
present a possible alternative that, in some circumstances, could
minimize such risks.
I. EXTRINSIC & INTRINSIC INCENTIVES

Before tackling the issue of whether legal enforcement of corporate
codes renders positive outcomes that outweigh the possible
repercussions, it is worth taking a preliminary look at why companies
create codes of conduct in the first place. Against this backdrop, let us
consider the possibility that there are good reasons and bad reasons for
why we do the things that we do. While doing something good is indeed
good, the reason why we do it ought to matter as well because lasting,
meaningful change requires having the right motivation. To illustrate
this point, Michael Sandel uses the example of paying children to read
books. While we can agree that incentivizing children to read is a good
initiative, we also recognize that children wanting to read for the sake of
reading might be preferable to children reading only for the sake of
getting paid. Sandel suggests that this is because "we corrupt a good, an
activity, or a social practice whenever we treat it according to a lower
norm than is appropriate to it."13

Sandel observed that there are high (or good) motives and low (or
bad) motives in value jurisprudence and those high motives can be
corrupted if we treat them as if they were low motives. High motives, for
13. MICHAEL J. SANDEL, WHAT MONEY CAN'T BUY: THE MORAL LIMITS OF MARKETS 59

(2012); see also Edward L. Deci, The Effects of Externally Mediated Rewards on Intrinsic
Motivation, 18 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PYSCHOL. 114 (1971) (noting that "when money is
used as an external reward for some activity, the subjects lose intrinsic interest for the
activity"); Harry F. Harlow et al., Learning Motivated by a Manipulation Drive, 40 J.
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 228, 231-34 (1950).
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example, are notions of public service, civic duty, fighting for fairness
and equality, and helping our fellow human beings in their times of
need. In sociology, these high motives (or motives that are intrinsically
derived) are associated with "inherent goodness."1 4 In the CSR context,
the argument that follows from this observation is that inherent
goodness-wanting to improve the working conditions and the
treatment of marginalized workers--can be eroded by our tendency to
enforce compliance to codes of conduct with threats of legal sanctions or
monetary incentives (e.g., continued business). While creatively using
contractual third party rights or negligence to enforce compliance to
otherwise voluntary codes of conduct might indeed be plausible, we
should pause, at least for a moment to ask the question, is doing so
desirable in the first place?
Tabling the erosion of goodness concern for the moment, let us apply
Sandel's framework of extrinsic versus intrinsic incentives in the
context of enforcing corporate codes. Surely, there are companies that
are intrinsically motivated by their Pollyannaish desire to "do good" and
behave accordingly in a socially responsible manner even in the absence
of some voluntary code. Just as there are intrinsically motivated
companies, there are companies-possibly an overwhelming majority of
them-that are extrinsically motivated and must be compelled into
behaving in a socially responsible manner. These extrinsically
motivated companies may appear to feign interest in being socially
responsible, but the real reason for doing so is because of "pressures
from consumers, investors, the media, and non-governmental
organizations" and the "fear of the effects of such pressure on
profitability."15 In the words of Emad Atiq, these external pressures and
incentives "compensate for the inadequacy of individuals' natural
motivations to behave in socially desirable ways,"16 but what impact
does this actually have on compliance in the long run or on the working
conditions of the marginalized workers? To refer back to Sandel's earlier
scenario, what happens when the kids stop getting paid to read? Will
they continue to read even without the external prompt or will they be
less likely to read than before? We will come back to this question a bit
later.

14. See Emad H. Atiq, Why Motives Matter: Reframing the Crowding Out Effect of
Legal Incentives, 123 YALE L.J. 1070, 1077-78 (2014).
15. Robert J. Liubicic, Corporate Codes of Conduct and ProductLabeling Schemes: The
Limits and Possibilities of Promoting International Labor Rights Through Private
Initiatives, 30 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 111, 114-16 (1998) (noting that "good public relations
are vital to the bottom-line interests of companies with images to protect").
16. Atiq, supra note 14, at 1072.
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A. Legal Sanctions & Extrinsic Incentives
The most basic way to distinguish intrinsic from extrinsic
motivations comes down to whether an individual wants to do
something for its own sake (intrinsic), or because there is a contingent,
"if-then" reward associated with doing something (extrinsic). The
previous section already hinted to the fact that many companies
implement codes of conduct due to external pressures.' 7 Besides the
purely market incentives, external pressure for companies to be socially
responsible can also come from a variety of other sources, including
compliance with labor laws and shareholder pressures, both of which
are examples of extrinsic motivators. The upstream buyers-what this
contribution has also been referring to as "the brands" or the "Nikes of
the world"-prodded by these external pressures often transfer that
demand to their downstream suppliers by attaching codes of conduct in
their contracts, which the buyer can enforce with threats of legal
sanctions. This is to suggest that by increasing the external pressures
put on companies by consumers and NGOs, the likelihood that
companies will put more pressure on their suppliers will increase, or in
the alternative, as illustrated by the De Beers example, companies will
simply stop doing businesses with "bad" suppliers or manufacturers to
avoid the public scrutiny.
Focusing for the moment on the relationship between the buyer and
the supplier, the process of the upstream buyer establishing codes of
conduct, monitoring, auditing, detecting violations, and then
sanctioning their suppliers is "the principal way both global
corporations and labor rights NGOs address poor working conditions in
global supply chain factories."18 Colloquially referred to as "the carrot or
the stick" approach, these types of extrinsic motivators certainly serve a
normative function,' 9 but the question here is whether they are effective
at really modifying corporate behavior. In the relationship between the
buyers and the suppliers, there is already an abundance of extrinsic
prompts (i.e., contract law, promise of continued business relationship
and profits, etc.) such that to legalize the otherwise voluntary code
17. See Hugh Collins, Conformity of Goods, the Network Society, and the Ethical
Consumer, 5 EUR. REV. PRIV. L. 619, 626 (2014) (noting that "[t]he dominant motivation
behind [codes of conduct] is presumably the concern that, if consumers believe that the
processes by which the product was produced violate ethical standards, they may boycott a
corporation's products in sufficient numbers to affect sales and profits").
18. Richard M. Locke et al., Does Monitoring Improve Labor Standards?Lessons from
Nike, 61 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 3, 3 (2007).
19. It could also be argued that the law, as a normative instrument, could render
intrinsic motivation, but this argument will be addressed later in this contribution. See
infra Part I.C.
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would simply be to add an extra layer of extrinsic incentives. Even at

the upstream level, there are a number of laws and extrinsic motivators
(i.e., labor law, consumer law, etc.) already in place that aim to modify
corporate behavior. So how much difference would a galvanized private
sector actually make by adding more extrinsic incentives?
1. When Extrinsic Incentives Work
To answer the question posed above, Hugh Collins admonished that
"we must remain skeptical about the effectiveness of much hyped
corporate codes of conduct and similar measures in upholding minimum
labor standards, for even well-intentioned Western corporations cannot
properly supervise the daily conduct of management in foreign business
in the context of the 'organized irresponsibility' of business networks." 20
The point Collins makes is quite clear: extrinsic motivators work well
enough if there is constant monitoring and effective enforcement.
Absent such external pressures, corporate codes might be ineffective,
even in the presence of a well-intentioned, galvanized private sector.
In addition to Collins's point, a series of studies have shown that
"external rewards and punishments-both carrots and sticks-can work
nicely for algorithmic tasks . . ." but "they can be devastating for
heuristic ones." 21 So extrinsic incentives, given the right circumstances

may improve the performance of menial tasks but perhaps not tasks
that require a lot of thought or creativity. Various aspects involved in
the management of the global supply chain and ensuring compliance to
corporate codes, however, cannot be described as menial tasks, which
raises the question of whether external pressures like legal norms are
really the best tool for corporate behavior modification. If anything, it is
worth observing that these are the exact same obstacles (i.e., inefficient
oversight, lack of oversight, etc.) that government regulations often face,
and to expect private actors to do any better would be speculative at
best.
While Beckers argues that it is viable for private law to "recognize
these corporate codes as evolving serious unilateral forms of

20. Collins, supra note 17, at 626.
21. DANIEL

H.

PINK, DRIVE: THE SURPRISING TRUTH ABOUT WHAT MOTIVATES US 30

(2009) (summarizing arguments made in TERESA M. AMABILE, CREATIVITY IN CONTEXT
(1996)); see also CAROL S. DWECK, SELF-THEORIES: THEIR ROLE IN MOTIVATION,
PERSONALITY, AND DEVELOPMENT 16-17 (1999) (discussing study conducted by Elaine
Elliot and Carol S. Dweck in 1988 finding that children who focus on "measuring ability"
will condemn their own abilities when facing adversity, whereas children who focus on
"learning" will treat adversity as a challenge and overcome them without condemning
their ability).
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regulations" that ultimately make enforcement possible, 22 the question
worth revisiting is whether this is desirable in the first place. There are
persuasive arguments to doubt that threats of lawsuits or creative use
of private law instruments provide an adequate incentive for companies
to comply with corporate codes. This leads us to the next section on
when and why extrinsic incentives fail.
2. When Extrinsic Incentives Fail
Borrowing from the fields of psychology and sociology, various
studies have substantiated the claim that in order to modify behavior,
2
we must not rely solely on external-control systems. 3 A series of
empirical research on the effectiveness of these compliance mechanisms
validate this point:
As for using incentives to promote compliance, the
threat of sanctions in the form of reduced orders for
noncompliant suppliers is rarely enforced, and factories
that systematically improve their working conditions are
not always rewarded (again, in the form of increased
orders). Even if this threat were enforced, it could create
perverse outcomes by punishing workers along with
management and removing any continued incentives for
factories to improve working conditions. 24
This is to say that especially at the buyer/supplier level, extrinsic
incentives are terribly inefficient and ineffective. It has been shown
time and time again that even if properly monitored, codes of conduct
are "not producing the large and sustained improvements in workplace
conditions that many had hoped it would." 25 The reality of the fastpaced global supply chain is that "orders are often in the pipeline well
before audits have been scheduled and that these global companies
continue to place orders in many factories that have serious compliance

22. BECKERS, supra note 9, at 30.
23. See Edward L. Deci, IntrinsicMotivation, Extrinsic Reinforcement, and Inequity, 22
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 113, 119-20 (1972) (suggesting that "one who is
interested in developing and enhancing intrinsic motivation in children, employees,
students, etc., should not concentrate on external-control systems such as monetary
rewards"); see also PINK, supra note 21, at 134-35 (concurring that "profit motive, potent
though it is, can be an insufficient impetus for both individuals and organizations").
24. LOCKE, supranote 1, at 38-39.
25. Locke et al., supranote 18, at 21.
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issues." 26 To this point, in-depth research led, again, by Richard Locke
and his team, showed that "[t]his reality does little to create the 'right'
incentives needed to shift the 'calculus of compliance' by raising the cost
of code violation above the cost of compliance and motivating steady
improvements in factory conditions." 27 So we now have evidence to show
that an extrinsic incentive, in and of itself, is not only ineffective, but
that "as an emotional catalyst .

.

. [it] lacks the power to fully mobilize

human energies." 28
B. Legal Norms v. Social Norms in the CSR Context: A Necessary Detour
If additional extrinsic incentives are not the preferred solution,
especially at the buyer/supplier level, it reasons to suggest that perhaps
intrinsic incentives are the necessary catalyst to bring about truly
meaningful changes. 29 So where does intrinsic motivation actually come
from? Earlier, I stated that when an individual wants to do something
for its own sake, and not because of a contingent reward associated with
it that is said to be an example of intrinsic motivation. While
philosophers could debate endlessly about whether purely intrinsic
motivations actually exist (similar to the controversy surrounding
whether altruism really exists), 30 for the sake of this contribution, we
will assume that intrinsic motivations do actually exist and that they
can be differentiated from extrinsic incentives. The more interesting
argument that will be advanced in this contribution is to suggest that
social norms are more conducive to creating and fostering intrinsic
norms vis-A-vis legal norms. This opens up a Pandora's Box of sorts and
the need for us to differentiate legal norms from social norms. The
following paragraphs will be a detour to address this pesky, but
necessary point.

26. LOCKE, supra note 1, at 38.
27. Id (reporting based on an analysis of over 800 Nike suppliers in 51 countries).
28. Gary Hamel, Moon Shots for Management, HARv. Bus. REV., Feb. 2009, at 92.
29. BRUNO S. FREY, NOT JUST FOR THE MONEY: AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF PERSONAL

MOTIVATION 118-19 (1997) (noting that "[i]ntrinsic motivation presents an important
determinant of human behaviour").
30. The controversy about altruism revolves around the claim that there can never be a
truly selfless act. Even when helping others and sacrificing oneself, if one were to obtain
pleasure from that act, then that act is said to be "selfish." Similarly, if our morals and
values are shaped, at least initially, by our society or some other external stimuli, then
nothing can be considered as purely intrinsic.
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The likes of Austin, 3 1 Kelsen, 32 Hart, 33 Weber, 34 Dworkin,35 Posner, 36
and many other prominent scholars have offered extensive explanations
in their own attempts to distinguish laws from social norms and morals.
This contribution, however, aspires to do no such thing nor will it
replicate their discussions here, as that is not the intended aim of this
contribution. Only to the extent that this contribution considers the
reliance on legal norms to produce different outcomes from relying on
social norms, the lessons from their debates will be bastardized and
aggressively simplified to the following: Morals are internal or implicit
standards of behavior that individuals possess that, when collectively
manifested, become the foundation of societal or social norms. When
these social norms are explicitly codified by governments or enforced by
governing bodies, these social norms become laws or legal norms. At the
same time, we must recognize that the law, as a normative instrument,
can serve to influence what the accepted norms of the society ought to
be, which in turn can influence our individual morals. In other words,
the relationships between the law, social norms, and individual morals
are quite incestuous and circular.
The difficulty in distinguishing legal norms from social norms,
especially in the CSR context, derives from the fact that by requiring
private actors to hold companies liable for otherwise voluntary codes, we
are essentially asking private individuals to function as quasi-governing
bodies, thus further blurring the distinction between legal norms and
social norms. While regulatory enforcement of labor law by governments
and the enforcement of CSR codes by private parties (through reliance
on private law) are admittedly different things, they both share a
common goal in this context that is ultimately to hold companies
accountable and to improve the working conditions of the marginalized
workers. It follows that the enforcement of a "legal norm," at least in our
31. See generally JOHN AUSTIN,

THE PROVINCE

OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED

(London, Prometheus Books 2000) (1832) (recognizing law, or more specifically positive
law, as something that has power over an individual).
32. See generally HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 8 (Max Knight, trans. 1967)
(coining the term Grundnorm or "basic norm").
33. See generally H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 193 (1961) (stating that there is
an inherent aspect of authority with the law as "those who would voluntarily obey shall
not be sacrificed to those who would not").
34. See generally MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE

SOCIOLOGY 2 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 1978) (providing a general summary of
economy and law, comparing social structures and normative orders).
35. See generally RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977) (arguing
against the theory of rights proposed by Hart and introducing a new moral framework of
rights).
36. See generally ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS (2000) (offering a new
model of the relationship between "legal and nonlegal mechanisms of cooperation").
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CSR context, cannot be limited to the enforcement of codified norms by
governments, but must also include instances when private actors
emulate or serve the functions of a governing body through private law.
When compelling companies to be more socially responsible, we
must further distinguish when private actors are relying on the law
from when they are not. Private actors relying on private law
instruments to hold companies accountable ought to be classified as
enforcers of legal norms, whereas private actors compelling companies
to behave in a socially responsible manner through nonlegal means
(e.g., grassroots campaigns and staging boycotts) ought to be considered
as instigators for change based on social norms. As a way of concluding
this detour, for the duration of this contribution, legal norms are
different from social norms in the sense that breaching legal norms
brings about legally enforceable sanctions by governments or private
actors fulfilling a role of a quasi-governing body (akin to them making a
citizen's arrest), whereas breaching social norms does not bring about
legally enforceable sanctions.
C. Social Norms & IntrinsicIncentives
The argument put forward before the necessary detour was that
social norms can be more effective than legal norms for creating and
fostering intrinsic motivations.3 7 Related to this point, Eric Posner
observed that "most people refrain most of the time from antisocial
behavior even when the law is absent or has no force [because t]hey
conform to social norms."3 8 In addition, take into account the rather

surprising amount of literature that lists the various benefits of social
norms vis-a-vis legal norms. For example, a social norm is often seen as
an effective tool in a variety of circumstances to achieve social welfare, 39
to prevent market failures, 40 and to solve collective action problemS. 41

37. To be clear, this is not to suggest that social norms are intrinsic prompts by nature.
A valid argument could be made here that social norms can also function as extrinsic
incentives as well. The ostracization that can come as a result of violating a social norm
can just as well be considered as an extrinsic incentive.
38. POSNER, supra note 36, at 4.
39. Cf. George Akerlof, The Economics of Caste and of the Rat Race and Other Woeful
Tales, 90 Q. J. ECON. 599, 617 (1976) (suggesting that those who adhere to social norms
gain more societal benefits than those who break social norms); Kenneth J. Arrow, A
UtilitarianApproach to the Concept of Equality in Public Expenditure, 85 Q. J. ECON. 409,
409 (1971) (reconsidering the concept of social welfare equality per se by proposing models
to achieve output equality-maximization of the sum of individual utilities-of
government expenditures).
40. See Jules L. Coleman, Afterword: The Rational Choice Approach to Legal Rules, 65
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 177, 187 (1989) (arguing that in close-knit markets, social norms can
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Most important in our context, there is even evidence to show that
42
individuals conform better to nonlegal norms than to legal norms. It is
this relatively informal or voluntary nature of social norms that is often
said to be the reason why social norms are more conducive to trust
building and collaboration when compared to legal norms. The
subsection below will elaborate on this point further.
1. When Intrinsic Incentives Work
Having exhibited reasons for why social norms could be more
conducive to fostering intrinsic motivation, we must now determine how
social norms can lead to intrinsic incentives and in turn, how intrinsic
incentives can work to reduce labor exploitations in the global supply
chain. First, consider reciprocity as a social norm. Reciprocity has
"power by virtue of a kind of social contract among peers founded on
mutual respect. Thus, they are true norms." 43 In the supply chain
context, this social norm could work as follows: If a buyer expects
honesty and fair dealings from the suppliers, then the buyer must first
do the same. In other words, they must demonstrate to the suppliers
how to be socially responsible and show the suppliers how to do it right,
not just demand compliance. The details of how this type of a
collaborative relationship, one with a common shared goal, can improve
the working conditions of the marginalized workers will be tabled until
Section III of this Article. Suffice it to state here that reciprocity-a
social norm-creates intrinsic motivation because if someone shows you
kindness, it is in our nature to want to repay that kindness and it is this
desire to reciprocate that creates a sense of purpose or what Sandel
referred to as the high or good norm. 44 Needless to say, this type of an
incentive is drastically different from the extrinsic motivations created
by threats of legal sanctions. It is an internal sense of purpose and the

achieve desired efficiency without the need for legal oversight); cf. POSNER, supra note 36,
at 8.
41. See EDNA ULLMANN-MARGALIT, THE EMERGENCE OF NORMS 22 (1977) (posing that
collective action problems call for the emergence of social norms).
42. Steven Shavell, Law Versus Morality as Regulators of Conduct, 4 AM. L. & ECON.
REV. 227, 244 (2002) (arguing that "use of morality alone will be superior to use of law
alone as long as the added expense of the law exceeds its modest marginal social value").
43. MICHAEL TOMASELLO, WHY WE COOPERATE 36 (2009) (summarizing arguments
made by JEAN PIAGET, THE MORAL JUDGMENT OF THE CHILD (1932)).
44. See ROBERT B. CIALDINI, INFLUENCE: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PERSUASION 17 (rev. ed.

2007) (laying out the rule of reciprocity); cf. EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN
SOCIETY 97 (Steven Lukes ed., W.D. Halls trans., 2014) (noting that "reciprocity is possible
only where cooperation exists and this in turn does not occur without the division of
labor").
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notion of working toward a shared common goal that incentivize us to
better adhere to the standards cast by the society rather than when we
are just told to do something.4 5
2. When IntrinsicIncentives Fail
The previous subsection argued that informal sanctioning based on
social norms can be, at times, a better enforcement mechanism than a
set of rigid legal sanctions, 46 but this is not always the case. To be clear,
extrinsic incentives are very much necessary, just as labor laws and
regulatory enforcements are necessary, because intrinsic motivations
alone will not necessarily fix all of the problems in the global supply
chain. There will be times even when intrinsic incentives fail and times
where it is appropriate to fall back on legal sanctions and other external
devices. What is important to bear in mind is that the purpose of this
contribution is not necessarily to refute the desirability and the viability
of enforcing corporate codes through private law or to prevent
consumers or buyers from doing so entirely. The objective of this
contribution is merely to raise some of the latent repercussions
associated with doing so and to present a possible alternative that, in
some circumstances, could be more beneficial than the legal
enforcement of voluntary codes of conduct. This objective is of great
importance given that in recent times "there has been a gradual
displacement of nonlegal regulation by legal regulation." 47
With this in mind, the first section can thus be summarized as
follows: To advocate for voluntary corporate codes to be enforced legally
through private law mechanisms, essentially would be to treat codes of
conduct as binding legal norms, which would require brands to police
their supply chain as enforcers and for consumers to essentially make
"citizen's arrests" in order to hold companies accountable. Advocating
for the desirability of such measures would be to implicitly stand by and
endorse the effectiveness of extrinsic incentives as behavior modifiers,
which has been proven to be a less effective strategy than previously
believed. The next section will show that not only is it a less than
effective strategy, but possibly a counterproductive one as well.

45. See TOMASELLO, supra note 43, at 38 (arguing that children, even as young as
three, observe and enforce social norms because they recognize they are part of a larger
collective society).
46. Cf. Christine Horne, Sociological Perspectives on the Emergence of Social Norms,
in SOCIAL NORMS, 3, 19 (Michael Hechter & Karl-Dieter Opp eds., 2001) (arguing that
social norms are an effective control mechanism when informal social sanctions are
present).
47. POSNER, supranote 36, at 8.
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II. RISKS OF LEGALLY ENFORCING VOLUNTARY CODES

This section, as promised above, will provide additional reasons why
converting otherwise voluntary codes of conduct into legally enforceable
promises could be a less than desirable process by taking into
consideration the possibility of the crowding out effect and the spillover
effect that could arise from the conversion process.
A. When the Law Spills Over
A spillover effect occurs when one action creates seemingly
unrelated or unintended consequences. For example, the typical carrotor-stick type of extrinsic incentive system tends to have substantial
48
For
negative effects in that it incentivizes unethical behavior.
employees
lead
may
carrot]
[the
goals
example, "[t]he very presence of
to focus myopically on short-term gains and to lose sight of the potential
devastating long-term effects on the organization." 49 Similarly, a study
of fifty-one corporate "pay-for-performance" schemes found that
extrinsic motivations such as monetary incentives "can result in a
negative impact on overall performance."50 This phenomenon is just one
illustration of a spillover effect, where the extrinsic incentive that was
implemented rendered unintended and detrimental consequences
counterproductive to the original goal. 51 This section will elaborate in
more detail below about the spillover effects that can arise from taking
corporate codes too seriously.
1. Substantiatingthe Spillover Effect

48. See Edward L. Deci et al., A Meta-Analytic Review of Experiments Examining the
Effects of Extrinsic Rewards on Intrinsic Motivation, 125 PSYCHOL. BULL. 627, 659 (1999)
("[R]eward contingencies undermine people's taking responsibility for motivating or
regulating themselves."); PINK, supra note 21, at 50 ("[Gloals imposed by others-sales
targets, quarterly returns, standardized test scores, and so on-can sometimes have
dangerous side effects.").
49. Lisa D. Ord6fiez et al., Goals Gone Wild: The Systematic Side Effects of OverPrescribing Goal Setting 7 (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 09-083, 2009),
http://www.hbs.edulfaculty/Publication%20Files/09-083.pdf.
50. When Performance-Related Pay Backfires, LONDON SCH. ECON. & POL. Sol. (June
24, 2009), httpJ/vww.1se.ac.uk/ewsAndMediaews/ahives2009/6/performancepayaspx.
51. See Gunther Teubner, Juridification: Concepts, Aspects, Limits, Solutions, in
JURIDIFICATION OF SOCIAL SPHERES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS IN THE AREAS OF LABOR,
CORPORATE, ANTITRUST AND SOCIAL WELFARE LAw 3 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1987)

(arguing that legal intervention in highly complex situations could produce a "regulatory
trilemma," where the legal intervention can be ineffective, counterproductive, and
incoherent).
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Section I of this contribution already alluded to the fact that
enforcing code violations with legal sanctions could create perverse
outcomes that end up punishing workers or removing continued
incentives for factories to improve working conditions. 52 For example,
seeking damages from the supplier or terminating contractual
relationships with suppliers that failed to meet the code could lead to a
reduction of the supplier's already slim profit margins. This could force
the already budget-constrained supplier to fire its employees and
further marginalize them. 53 Another typical example of a spillover is the
emergence of temporary workers and independent contractors. In order
to circumvent providing benefits and protections entitled to employees,
many businesses hire contractors rather than employees. For example,
"[m]any Mexican electronics suppliers hire agency workers on multiple
sequential short-term contracts so that workers fail to accumulate
employment benefits afforded to full-time workers as required by the
national labor code." 54 While some jurisdictions have laws that explicitly
prohibit this type of questionable corporate behavior, it is often difficult
to enforce them. As a result, laws intended to empower and protect
workers create a spillover effect of sorts, where the workers get hired
through sequential short-term contracts or as mere contractors. These
are classic examples of when attempting to improve the working
conditions of marginalized workers could exacerbate the problem. This,
in a nutshell, is the spillover effect, which also reaffirms the risks of
extrinsic motivators. The following subsection will address other, more
latent examples of the spillover effect and its risks in the CSR context.
a. Kasky v. Nike Example
In Kasky v. Nike, Nike was sued for making allegedly false
statements about the working conditions of its supply chain to the
public.55 The thrust of Kasky's argument was that "[t]o the extent that
MNCs [multinational corporations] are using their adherence to
voluntary codes as a means of assuaging public concerns about their
activities abroad, then MNCs should be prepared to have those claims

52. LOCKE, supra note 1, at 38-39.
53. Paul Krugman, Reckonings; Hearts and Heads, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 22, 2001),
httpJ//www.nytimes.mm/2001/0422/opinion/ickonings-hearts-and-heads.html (citing Oxfam findings
that displaced child sweatshop workers ended up with worse jobs, became unemployed, or
were forced into prostitution).
54. LOCKE, supra note 1, at 160.
55. Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 27 Cal. 4th 939, 946-48 (Cal. 2002).
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56
scrutinized as a matter of consumer protection laws." The facts of the

case are as follows: Since 1993, Nike had claimed that it "assumed
responsibility for its subcontractors' compliance with applicable local
laws and regulations concerning minimum wage, overtime, occupational
health and safety, and environmental protection."5 7 Between 1996 and
1997, however, serious labor exploitations were discovered in factories
subcontracted by Nike in countries such as China, Vietnam, and
Indonesia.5 8 In response to these allegations and adverse publicity, Nike
denied these claims wholeheartedly:
Nike and the individual defendants said that workers
who make Nike products are protected from physical
and sexual abuse, that they are paid in accordance with
applicable local laws and regulations governing wages
and hours, that they are paid on average double the
applicable local minimum wage, that they receive a
'living wage', that they receive free meals and health
care, and that their working conditions are in
compliance with applicable local laws and regulations
governing occupational health and safety. 59
This denial, which was published in a press release and circulated
in newspapers nationwide, served as the basis of Kasky's claim. Kasky
argued that Nike made these statements "for the purpose of
60
maintaining and increasing [Nike's] sales and profits" and that Nike's

statements were made "with knowledge or reckless disregard of the
laws of California prohibiting false and misleading statements." 6' Kasky
initially brought the suit against Nike on behalf of the general public of
the state of California, under California Business and Professions Code
Sections 17204 (unfair and deceptive practices) and 17535 (false
advertising). 62 As a side note, it is worth noting that this case is the
manifestation of one of Beckers's ideas where a private actor used
56. Sean D. Murphy, Taking Multinational Corporate Codes of Conduct to the Next
Level, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 389, 431 (2005).
57. Kasky, 27 Cal. 4th at 947.
58. Id. (citing news reports that "workers were paid less than the applicable local
minimum wage; required to work overtime; allowed and encouraged to work more
overtime hours than applicable local law allowed; subjected to physical, verbal, and sexual
abuse; and exposed to toxic chemicals, noise, heat, and dust without adequate safety
equipment, in violation of applicable local occupational health and safety regulations").
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 948.
62. Id. at 946-47.
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private law instruments in order to hold a company accountable. 63
Again, this contribution does not contest that doing so would indeed
hold companies more accountable but asks a different question of what
impact this would actually have at the supplier/manufacturer level,
where most of the violations are taking place.
In response to Kasky's claims, Nike filed a demurrer arguing that
his suit was barred on the grounds of Nike's freedom of speech. Before
the actual issue of false advertising could be debated at the Superior
Court level, the case went to the Court of Appeal and subsequently to
the California Supreme Court, where the pivotal issue became whether
Nike's public statements-its speech-was protected under the First
Amendment. The California Supreme Court ultimately held that "when
a corporation, to maintain and increase its sales and profits, makes
public statements defending labor practices and working conditions at
factories where its products are made, those public statements are
commercial speech that may be regulated to prevent consumer
deception." 64 On appeal, this case went up to the United States Supreme
Court, which initially granted certiorari, but the Court subsequently
dismissed the writ as "improvidently granted."6 5 In other words, the
U.S. Supreme Court did not adjudicate on the substantive basis of
Nike's free speech claim. Once the U.S. Supreme Court kicked the case
back down to the California courts, the parties eventually decided to
settle the case, the details of which the public was not privy to.
While this was indeed a "win" for Kasky, the spillover effect from
this victory was that companies like Nike learned from this "mistake"
and since then have generally been more careful about making
definitive public statements about their corporate social responsibility.66
Rather than definitively stating that "we are socially responsible," many
63. See Fabrizio Cafaggi, The Regulatory Functions of Transnational Commercial
Contracts: New Architectures, 36 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1557, 1562 (2013) (noting that
"[w]hen suppliers commit to comply with social standards related to children, gender, or
general labor conditions and these obligations have become part of the commercial
contract, a breach may refer to the 'commercial' contract with the buyer, to the
employment contract, and to the code of conduct imposing obligations and the certification
regime that attests compliance with fair labor conditions").
64. Kasky, 27 Cal. 4th at 969.
65. Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 657-58 (2003) (holding that "(1) the judgment
entered by the California Supreme Court was not final within the meaning of 28 USC
§1257; (2) neither party has standing to invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court; and (3)
the reasons for avoiding the premature adjudication of novel constitutional questions
apply with special force to this case").
66. McBarnet, supra note 10, at 42 (observing that "[a]s a result of Kasky v. Nike, and
similar legal developments elsewhere, business organizations have been put on notice to
be wary of their CSR PR, and perhaps to be conscious that their voluntary codes of
conduct and CSR reports may prove less voluntary than they thought.").
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codes of conduct and public statements uttered in the aftermath of cases
like Kasky display a certain level of temerity. Nike's Code of Conduct,
for example, employs the following phrases: "there is no finish line,"
"our work with contract factories is always evolving," and "[iut is our
intention to use these standards . . . ."67 The "promises" laid out in Nike's
Code of Conduct are intended to improve its reputation but have been
carefully crafted so that Nike will not be held liable in the event that
they fail. If companies are careful in this way, it makes it more difficult
for consumers to make claims based on reasonable reliance or false
advertisement. The lesson here is that when introducing legal sanctions
or the threat thereof in regard to compliance to codes, the spillover
effect could be that companies, in the long run, will simply stop making
statements that could put them in hot water or forget about
implementing a CSR code all together.
To illustrate this latter point, there is an interesting example
arising out of Germany. In April of 2010, the Hamburg Customer
Protection Agency accused a German retailer, Lid1, of unfair
competition, based on the fact that Lidl advertised certain products to
be socially responsible when, in fact, its suppliers in Bangladesh were
exploiting laborers.68 The legal basis of the claim was the European
Union's Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 6 9 which prevents
companies from making misleading claims to consumers that could
unfairly advantage the business making unsubstantiated claims. Lid1
eventually settled out of court and was forced to retract its ads
promoting its social responsibility. The spillover from all of this was
that Lidl has yet to implement a new CSR code. This example not only
shows that sometimes consumers going after a company to hold them
accountable could lead to that company abandoning its corporate code in
its entirety but, moreover, raises the interesting point on perverse
incentives. If we were to take corporate codes too seriously by going
after companies that implement codes, the public will essentially be
targeting companies that are at least trying to be socially responsible
while not targeting companies that do not even bother to be socially
responsible. While cases like Nike and Lidl might be boasted as a
67. Nike, Inc. Code of Conduct, NIKE, INC., http://about.nike.com/pages/transformmanufacturing (follow "Code of Conduct" hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 22, 2016) (emphasis
added).
68. See Ramon Mullerat, InternationalPrinciples and Rules-Current Legal and Soft
Law Initiatives, in GLOBAL BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: JURISDICTIONAL COMPARISONS
15, 37 (James Featherby et al. eds., 2011).
69. See Council Directive 2005/29, Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, art. 6(2)(b),
2005 O.J. (L 149) 22, 28 (EU) (stating that a company is bound "where the commitment is
not aspirational but is firm and is capable of being verified, and the trader indicates in a
commercial practice that he is bound by the code").
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"victory" for the consumers by some, a key question remains
unanswered: What impact did these so-called victories actually have on
improving the working conditions of the marginalized workers?
b. The Benefit CorporationExample
Another argument to substantiate the spillover effect of legally
enforcing codes of conduct is the reality that "extrinsic prompts deprive
the individual of that chance to exhibit her intrinsic motivations to
others, which, in turn, undermines the value to the individual of having
intrinsic motives." 70 In other words, CSR measures such as codes of
conduct and self-regulations "can place more responsible firms at a
competitive disadvantage in international competition."7 1 Take, for
example, companies that incorporate as benefit corporations in the
United States. 72 Incorporating as a benefit corporation requires a
company to be transparent in regard to their social and environmental
performance standards as well as to meet a higher legal accountability
standard. 73 This essentially means putting social objectives on par with
financial objectives explicitly in its corporate charter, which must state
a specific public purpose that the corporation will pursue. These
requirements add a heighted sense of accountability for the directors
whose fiduciary duty is no longer limited to maximizing profits but to do
so in a socially responsible manner.
While one could argue that the emergence of the benefit corporation
and the enforcement of codes of conduct through private law
instruments can harmoniously coexist-possibly even be mutually
beneficial-there is a lingering concern of a possible spillover.
Incorporating as a benefit corporation, a voluntary choice that
companies make, is more likely to be a decision based on intrinsic
motivation rather than extrinsic motivation. It is unquestionably a more
serious commitment to being socially responsible compared to nonbenefit companies that simply implement a corporate code. While
benefit corporations require both their shareholders and directors to
treat social responsibility on par with their other fiduciary duties,
70. Atiq, supra note 14, at 1081; see also Bruno Frey, Crowding out and Crowding in of
Intrinsic Preferences, in REFLEXIVE GOVERNANCE FOR GLOBAL PuBLIC GOODS 75, 78 (Eric

Brousseau et al. eds., 2012).
71. DAVID VOGEL, THE MARKET FOR VIRTUE: THE POTENTIAL AND
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY xvii (paperback ed. 2006).

LIMITS

OF

72. Currently, benefit corporation legislation is effective in over half the country and
numerous states are working to pass legislation. FAQ, BENEFIT CORPORATION,
http://benefitcorp.net/faq (last visited Sept. 22, 2016).
73. B LAB, B CORPORATION 2012 ANNUAL REPORT 6 (2012) https//www.burporation.net/
sitesal/themesadaptivetheme/burppdfBrpAP2012 Web-Version.pdf
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companies not registered as a benefit corporation hold profit as their
primary objective. The problem, as hinted earlier, is that legalizing
corporate codes could place more responsible firms-the benefit
corporations of the world-at a competitive disadvantage. 74
For instance, when the public goes after some non-benefit
companies that supposedly violated their corporate codes, this creates
an appearance, at least, that the companies the consumer watchdogs
did not go after are legitimate or that they are socially responsible. If
these companies can be perceived as being socially responsible, without
actually incorporating as a benefit corporation, benefit corporations
might lose out on the recognition that they rightfully deserve. The
spillover here is that by legitimizing a possible "imposter," companies
that are intrinsically motivated (i.e., benefit corporations) could be put
at a competitive disadvantage vis-A-vis companies that are only
extrinsically motivated. This spillover is also an example of a crowding
out effect, which will be addressed in the next subsection. To summarize
the point on the spillover effect, "taking corporate codes seriously" could
make it more difficult for the public to distinguish companies that are
intrinsically motivated from those that are extrinsically motivated to
the detriment of companies that are actually trying to make a
meaningful change.
2. The Spillover Effect in the CSR Context
One of the reasons why voluntary codes proliferated in the first
place was exactly because of their nonbinding nature. The spillover
effect for enforcing them legally could be the reduction of CSR
initiatives and their desirability. While some might consider the
voluntary nature of many CSR measures to be its weakness, this
perceived "weakness" is also its primary strength.7 5 It is because of this
voluntary nature that intrinsically motivated companies can signal to
the public that they are being socially responsible. By making
compliance to these codes essentially mandatory, spillovers are bound to
happen. The next section will discuss a related phenomenon of the
crowding out effect and how the proposal to take codes of conduct
seriously could render even more detrimental side effects.
B. When the Law Crowds Out

74. VOGEL, supranote 71, at xvii.
75. See, e.g., JAN EIJSBOUTS, CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY, BEYOND VOLUNTARISM:
REGULATORY OPTIONS TO REINFORCE THE LICENCE TO OPERATE 11-17 (2011).
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The crowding out effect, in its most basic sense, is the phenomenon
where an increase in one aspect of regulation leads to the decrease
(thus, the crowding out) in other types of regulation. Sandel, for
example, observed that "economists often assume that markets do not
touch or taint the goods they regulate. But this is untrue. Markets leave
their mark on social norms. Often, market incentives erode or crowd out
nonmarket incentives."76 In the CSR context, this can be seen in two
different but related ways: first, an increase in the number of legal
sanctions or the enforcement of codes of conduct by relying on private
law can crowd out or reduce the impact of nonlegal or social norms; and
second, the introduction of extrinsic incentives can similarly crowd out
intrinsic incentives.
Here are some examples: The previous section on the spillover effect
suggested that legalizing the enforcement of codes of conduct could
crowd out or reduce the incentive for companies to incorporate as a
benefit corporation. Another classic example of this is that CSR, as a
self-regulatory mechanism, could prevent governments from taking
necessary steps to create regulation and deflect regulatory scrutiny in
the hopes that CSR measures can address the problem.77 The converse
of this is equally true: if there is an excess of legal sanctions, nonlegal
norms could be crowded out. This section will illustrate more examples
of the crowding out effect and attempt to substantiate how it can pose
serious risks that could undermine the entire thought behind the
legalization of voluntary codes.
1. Substantiatingthe Crowding Out Effect
There is plenty of evidence to support the claim that legal or
extrinsic sanctions can be ineffective, if not down right detrimental,
from a diverse field of studies ranging from sociology, behavioral
psychology, and even evolutionary anthropology. In the words of
evolutionary anthropologist Michael Tomasello, "[i]n the case of an
intrinsically rewarding activity, external rewards undermine this
intrinsic motivation. . . ."78 Political philosopher Michael Sandel concurs
that "[wihen people are engaged in an activity they consider

76. SANDEL, supra note 13, at 64; see also, DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE
HIDDEN FORCES THAT SHAPE OuR DECISIONs 68-69 (describing how monetary incentives

can corrupt intrinsic incentives and how market norms can crowd out or push out social
norms).

77. See LOCKE, supra note 1, at 157; see also VOGEL, supranote 71, at 162-66.
78. TOMASELLO, supra note 43, at 9-10 (observing that children who are initially
rewarded are less likely to help in a repeated situation than are children who are not
rewarded initially due to what is known as the "overjustification effect").
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intrinsically worthwhile, offering them money may weaken their
motivation by depreciating or 'crowding out' their intrinsic interest or
commitment."

7

Sociologist, Christine Horne, has similarly admonished

social exchanges

. . . violates the social

norms and hurts . .

.

that "the existence of a strong legal system inhibits informal
sanctioning and weakens the social relations that facilitate the exercise
of such control."8 0 Legal philosopher Emad Atiq has noted that laws are
by nature extrinsic prompts that "compete with or 'crowd out' the
8
agent's intrinsic . . . motivation to engage in an activity." ' Behavioral
economist Dan Ariely observed that "introducing market norms into
relationships." 82 Daniel Pink, a former aide to Secretary of Labor Robert
Reich (subsequently turned motivation guru), succinctly described the
crowding out effect in the following manner:
Say you take people who are motivated to behave nicely,
then give them a fairly weak set of ethical standards to
meet. Now, instead of asking them to 'do it because it's
the right thing to do,' you've essentially given them an
alternate set of standards-do this so you can check off
83
all these boxes.

The most impressive collection of research conducted on the subject
of the crowding out effect was led by Edward Deci, one of the pioneers in
this field, who found that the crowding out effect has been tested and
the results replicated in a meta-analysis of 128 studies over three
decades. Deci concluded that "the crowding out effect is a robust
phenomenon, and many kinds of tangible rewards for socially desirable
behavior undermine intrinsic motivation." 84 In addition, there is even
more empirical research that substantiates the observation that
individuals lose their intrinsic motivations for engaging in an activity
when they are successfully induced to participate in it for extrinsic

79. SANDEL, supra note 13, at 122; see also Deci et al., supra note 48, at 628-29.
80. Horne, supra note 46, at 20; see also Christine Horne, Community and the State:
The Relationship Between Normative and Legal Controls, 16 EUR. Soc. REV. 225, 236-37
(2000).
81. Atiq, supra note 14, at 1080.
82. ARIELY, supranote 76, at 76.
83. PINK, supra note 21, at 139-40 (citing Evaluating Your Business Ethics, GALLUP
(June 12, 2008), http://www.gallup.com/businessjournal/107527/evaluating-your-businessethics.aspx).
84. Atiq, supra note 14, at 1083 (citing Deci et al, supra note 48, at 627); see also PINK,
supra note 21, at 37.
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reasons.8 5 The following subsection will replicate some of the more
popular and most commonly cited examples.
a. IsraeliDay Care Example
The Israeli daycare experiment,86 a study conducted by Uri Gneezy
and Aldo Rustichini, asked the question of "whether imposing a
[monetary] fine on parents who arrived late to pick up their children
was a useful deterrent."8 7 The answer that the researchers found was
"no, the fine [was] not a useful deterrent," but more alarmingly, the
problem (of parents being late) got worse after the imposition of the fine.
This phenomenon can be explained in the following way:
Before the fine was introduced, the teachers and parents
had a social contract, with social norms about being late.
Thus, if parents were late ...

they felt guilty about it ...

and their guilt compelled them to be more prompt in
picking up their kids in the future .... But once the fine
was imposed, the day care center had inadvertently
replaced the social norms with [legal] norms.88

85. See Atiq, supra note 14, at 1072; see also SANDEL, supra note 13, at 122-25 (2012)
(citing a classic study of blood donation conducted by Richard Titmuss that illustrates
markets crowding out non-market norms); RICHARD M. TITMUSS, THE GIFT RELATIONSHIP:

FROM HUMAN BLOOD TO SOCIAL POLICY 314 (Ann Oakley & John Ashton eds. 1997)
(noting that "commercialisation of blood and donor relationships represses the expression
of altruism [and] erodes the sense of community. . ."); Yuval Feldman & Orly Lobel, The
Incentives Matrix7 The Comparative Effectiveness of Rewards, Liabilities, Duties, and
Protections for Reporting Illegality, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1151, 1151-52 (2010) (noting that in
some cases offering monetary rewards to whistle-blowers led to less, rather than more,
reporting of illegality); Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action,
and Law, 102 MICH. L. REV. 71, 72 (2003); Dan M. Kahan, Trust, Collective Action, and
Law, 81 B.U.L. REV. 333, 338-39 (2001) (noting that "the advent of incentives will produce
less, not more, of such [desirable] behavior"); Carl Mellstrom & Magnus Johannesson,
Crowding out in Blood Donation: Was Titmuss Right?, 6 J. EUR. EcoN. AS'N 845, 857
(2008) (affirming the argument of Richard M. Titmuss that monetary compensation for
blood donations crowds out the supply of blood and suggesting that the skepticism towards
monetary compensation for blood donations seen in many countries is warranted).
86. See generally Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine Is a Price, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1
(2000) (presenting the results of an experiment in which parents were made to pay a fine
if they were late to pick up their children from daycare and arguing that penalties may
have the opposite effect on behavior than expected, which, if true, would cause the
deterrence hypothesis to lose its predictive value).
87. ARIELY, supranote 76, at 76.
88. Id. at 76-77 (summarizing the research of Gneezy and Rustichini).
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The daycare example substantiates the claim that social norms can,
at times, be a more useful enforcement mechanism than stringent
regulations or the imposition of legal or monetary sanctions. To come
back to Sandel's earlier example about paying children to read books, it
seems entirely possible, given this observation, that once the monetary
incentives are gone, the children might be less inclined to read than
before because their intrinsic incentives have been eroded.
b. Swiss Nuclear Waste Example
Another example demonstrating the crowding out effect is the Swiss
Parliament's dilemma involving nuclear waste storage and its disposal.
The Swiss Parliament needed to find a city where it could store and
dispose nuclear waste. Social scientists, Bruno Frey and Felix
Oberholzer-Gee, conducted a survey asking Swiss residents whether
they would be willing to have the undesirable facility in their city.89 A
surprising 50 percent of the people said yes to this survey question in
the absence of any extrinsic prompts, but when Frey and OberholzerGee asked if they were willing to do so in return for a monetary
compensation the yes response dropped to 25 percent.90 This example,
one of the most often cited examples by social scientists, demonstrates
how extrinsic incentives can reduce the willingness of the populace to
behave in a desirable manner. The researchers in explaining this result
noted that "[e]mphasizing social norms and civic virtue [has] greater
effect on encouraging" good behavior than "threatening individuals with
legal sanctions." 91
c. Honest Tax Reporting in Minnesota Example
The problem of increasing compliance with tax laws in the state of
Minnesota also showed how cracking down on the people by increasing
the enforcement of tax codes may not be the best behavior modifier as
well. This study revealed that compliance to tax law increased, not
when taxpayers were "threatened with information about the risks of
punishment for noncompliance," but when they were "just told that
more than 90 percent of Minnesotans already complied, in full, with

89. Bruno S. Frey et al., The Old Lady Visits Your Backyard: A Tale of Morals and
Markets, 104 J. POL. ECON. 1297, 1302 (1996).
90. BARRY SCHWARTZ & KENNETH SHARPE, PRACTICAL WISDOM: THE RIGHT WAY TO Do
THE RIGHT THING 192 (2010).
91. Atiq, supra note 14, at 1084 (citing to research of Richard D. Schwartz & Sonya
Orleans, On Legal Sanctions, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 274, 299 (1967)).
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their obligations under the tax law." 92 The take away here is that

threats of sanctions and reminders for their need to comply did not
compel the taxpayers as much as the softer approach of simply letting
people know that the majority of the others had already complied. Based
on this finding, Sunstein and Thaler observed "either desirable or
undesirable behavior can be increased, at least to some extent, by
drawing public

attention to what others are

doing." 93 With this

realization, can we honestly assume that legally enforcing otherwise
voluntary corporate codes will be an effective solution to improve the
working conditions of the marginalized workers?
2. The Crowding Out Effect in the CSR Context
In the words of the aforementioned Daniel Pink, "[t]he problem is
that most business haven't caught up to this new understanding of what
motivates us" and that "[t]oo many organizations .

.

. still operate from

assumptions about human potential and individual performance that
are outdated, unexamined, and rooted more in folklore than in
science."94 Unfortunately, many lawyers, legislatures, and academics

seldom consider this fact either when advocating for new laws or
encouraging the public to rely on laws to solve our collective problems.
We must embrace the idea that there are other ways to resolve the labor
exploitation problem in the supply chain because relying too much on
the law will "reduce [] the likelihood that group members will impose
social sanctions," which could bring about a better result.9 5 If we take
the observations mentioned in this subsection at face value, there ought
to be serious hesitations about attempting to enforce otherwise
voluntary codes of conduct through private law instruments. In sum,
studies from eclectic and widespread disciplines confirm that not only do
extrinsic motivators, such as monetary rewards or threats of legal
sanctions, often fail to modify behavior (absent constant oversight and
effective enforcement), but more alarmingly, they can even be
detrimental to intrinsic motivations.

92. RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 67 (2009).
93. Id.
21, at 9.
95. Horne, supra note 46, at 20; see also Eric A. Posner, The Regulation of Groups: The
Influence of Legal and Nonlegal Sanctions on Collective Action, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 133, 136
(1996).
94. PINK, supra note
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C. Obligatory Caveat
Obviously, companies and consumers are not all tardy mothers
picking up their kids from daycare or taxpayers of dubious nature.
However, the point about how we as human beings perceive social
norms vis-A-vis legal norms or how we act based on intrinsic motivation
versus extrinsic motivation is an applicable observation in this context.
There are many situations when introducing legal norms to address a
particular problem crowds out the social norms, which could reduce
intrinsic motivations and ultimately exacerbate the problem.96 Looking
at the examples above, some might argue that companies do not fall
victim to the crowding out effect, believing that a group of individuals is
more reasonable and careful and thus will respond more logically to
extrinsic incentives than individuals. There is evidence, however, to
confront this particular view, as research shows that groups are just as
susceptible to these effects, if not more.97 "Groupthinking" and the
discussions that take place in the boardrooms of companies by groups of
individuals often produce unsatisfactory results. This is because "[flar
too often, groups actually amplify ... mistakes" made by individuals.98
In the interest of objectivity, however, it must be noted that not
every action has a crowding out effect or a spillover effect. For example,
it was stated earlier that external incentives work nicely for algorithmic
or menial tasks and there is no crowding out effect observed in such
cases.99 This commentary acknowledges that extrinsic incentives can be
a useful tool in various instances. However, as Simon Deakin
acknowledges, "mandatory legal rules may not be well suited to some
contexts,"100 and, surely, the same can be said for the legal enforcement

96. See ARIELY, supra note 76, at 72-73.
97. See Geoffrey M. Hodgson, Institutions and Individuals: Interactionand Evolution,
28 ORG. STUD. 95, 111 (2007) (noting that "[i]ndividuals have habits; groups have routines
. .. [which] are the organizational analogue of habits.").
98. CASS R. SUNSTEIN & REID HASTIE, WISER: GETTING BEYOND GROUPTHINK TO MAKE
GROUPS SMARTER 2 (2015); see also IRVING L. JANIS, GROUPTHINK: PSYCHOLOGICAL

STUDIES OF POLICY DECISIONS AND FIASCOES 7-9 (2d ed. 1982) (suggesting that groups are
susceptible to biases and mistakes even more than individuals because of group-thinking).
99. See Edward L. Deci et al., ExtrinsicRewards and Internal Motivation in Education:
Reconsidered Once Again, 71 REV. EDUC. RES. 1, 14 (2001) ("[R]ewards do not undermine
people's intrinsic motivation for dull tasks because there is little or no intrinsic motivation
to be undermined.").
100. Simon Deakin et al., Do Labour Laws Increase Equality at the Expense of Higher
Unemployment? The Experience of Six OECD Countries, 1970-2010 4 (Univ. of Cambridge
Faculty of Law Legal Studies, Working Paper No. 11, 2014); see also Simon Deakin,
Addressing Labour Market Segmentation: The Role of Labour Law 1 (Int'l Labour Office
Governance & Tripartism Dep't, Working Paper No. 52, 2013) ("The law largely reflects
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of otherwise voluntary codes of conduct. In short, we must be careful
about when to rely on extrinsic incentives and when not to, which brings
us to the point of the next section.
III. STRATEGIC RELIANCE ON THE LAW

One of the two aims of this contribution was to shed light on some of
the unintended externalities that can come about from legalizing
voluntary corporate codes. Having presented some of these problems in
the first two sections, this third section will now move on to the second
goal of this contribution, which is to offer an alternative approach that
could possibly minimize these risks.
A. The Goldilocks Problem
As noted above, extrinsic incentives are necessary at times, but not
to the extent that they crowd out intrinsic incentives. Given this
realization, we must be wary of any suggestions that advocate for more
and more laws to compel compliance. Therefore, in a challenge akin to
the one that confronted Goldilocks, we must choose or design an
approach that does not rely excessively on extrinsic incentives or rely on
intrinsic incentives alone. Instead, we must opt for the path that uses a
more balanced approach. The introduction of the inverted-U curve in
this context could be beneficial.
1. The Inverted- U Curve
Psychologists Barry Schwartz and Adam Grant observed that a
great many things of consequence obey the inverted-U curve: "Across
many domains of psychology, one finds that X increases Y to a point,
and then it decreases Y . . . . There is no such thing as an unmitigated
good. All positive traits, states, and experiences have costs that at high
levels may begin to outweigh their benefits."101 The concept of the
inverted-U is closely related to the Kuznet's curve and the economic
theory of diminishing marginal utility. 102 In the legal context, it can be

the economics forces and social norms which give rise to segmentation, but can amplify
and perpetuate its effects.").
101. Adam M. Grant & Barry Schwartz, Too Much of a Good Thing: The Challengeand
Opportunity of the Inverted U, 6 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. Scl. 61, 62 (2011), cited with
approval in MALCOLM GLADWELL, DAVID AND GOLIATH: UNDERDOGS, MISFITS, AND THE

ART OF BATTING GIANTS 52 (2013).
102. JAMES A. GWARTNEY ET AL., MICROECONOMICS: PRIVATE AND PUBLIC CHOICE 132
(15th ed. 2015) (explaining the law of diminishing marginal utility as "[t]he basic economic
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illustrated by the following example: If legal norms are introduced to a
state of complete anarchy, some sense of order may be restored
assuming that the legal norms can be enforced efficiently and fairly. 03
The addition of more legal norms (moving along the X-axis) may create
additional benefits (moving up the Y-axis), but after passing the apex of
the inverted-U curve, additional legal norms could become detrimental.
Could it be possible then that legally enforcing otherwise voluntary
corporate codes is the tipping point?
2. Enforcement of Code of Conduct &

The Inverted-U Curve

Legally enforcing otherwise voluntary corporate codes as advocated
could indeed hold companies more accountable, 104 but this
Beckers
by
does not necessarily root out the worst forms of labor exploitation in the
supply chain. Moreover, legally punishing suppliers or holding
companies liable to a code that they never intended to be legally
binding, as this contribution already noted, has dire consequences.
Given these negative externalities, an argument could be made that
Beckers's suggestion, if taken wholeheartedly or to the extreme, could
push us past the metaphorical apex of the inverted-U curve; however,
this question of where exactly the apex is located is outside the scope of
this particular contribution. Ultimately, Beckers would likely concur
that a more strategic use of both legal and social norms would be
prudent in the long run. As John Ruggie also confirms, the best course
of action for us would be to "motivate, activate, and benefit from all of
the moral, social, and economic rationales that can affect the behavior of
corporations..." and to "provid[e] incentives as well as punishments,
identify[] opportunities as well as risks, and build[] social movements
and political coalitions that involve representation from all relevant
sectors of society .... ."0 Our approach, thus, needs to be a holistic one
as a more "strategic use of the law" is necessary in order for us "to

principle that as the consumption of a product increases, the marginal utility derived from
consuming more of it (per unit of time) will eventually decline").
103. The absence of law or government does not, however, mean that there will be no
order. See POSNER, supra note 36, at 3 ("In a world with no law and rudimentary
government, order of some sort would exist. So much is clear from anthropological studies.
The order would appear as routine compliance with social norms and the collective
infliction of sanctions on those who violate them, including stigmatization of the deviant
and ostracism of the incorrigible.").
104. See BECKERS, supra note 9.
105. John Gerard Ruggie, Business and Human Rights: The Evolving International
Agenda, 101 AM. J. INT'L L. 819, 839-40 (2007).

176

INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 24:1

improve the way citizens conceptualize
other." 06

their obligations to each

B. Capability Building Rather Than Monitoring & Punishing
When it comes to the relationship between the buyer and the
supplier, suppliers, especially in developing economies, already "lack
resources, technical expertise, and management systems necessary to
address the root causes of compliance failures."107 The reality of our
supply chain is that buyers are not only demanding cheaper materials
from their suppliers, but also requiring them to be produced in a socially
responsible way, due to increasing external pressures from consumers
and NGOs.108 The consumers themselves also suffer from a similar type
of dissonance where they want goods to be made in a socially
responsible manner, but they are generally very cost-sensitive. As a
result, buyers and suppliers are "often locked in a low-trust trap in
which suppliers claim that brands are sending them mixed messages,
insisting on faster cycle times, better quality, and lower prices while
policing and admonishing them for poor working conditions."109 What
the buyers are expecting from their suppliers in many cases is the
impossible, and adding threats of legal sanctions to comply with
corporate codes does not make the impossible any more possible. What
could benefit the suppliers is if the buyers focused on building
relationships with the suppliers based on collaboration, mutual respect,
and the aforementioned social norms (e.g., reciprocity), which is more
conducive to creating and fostering intrinsic motivations. 10
In what Thomas Nagel calls the "view from nowhere" mindset, in
order to build a relationship based on mutual respect and collaboration,
what is necessary is an empathetic process of "putting yourself in
someone else's shoes," a step rarely taken by the buyers who only see
106. Atiq, supra note 14, at 1070.
107. LOCKE, supra note 1, at 78.
108. See id. at 38 (noting that "[w]hile sourcing departments continue to squeeze
factories on price, compress lead times, and demand high-quality standards, compliance
officers visit the factories and document the problems but do little to change the root
causes underlying poor working conditions").
109. Id. at 124.
110. See id. at 18 (describing a collaborative buyer-supplier relationship to be one that is
"based on a fundamental understanding that both the risks and the rewards of doing
business together would be distributed more or less fairly between the parties; the gains
would not be captured nor the losses borne by one or the party alone. It was this
recognition and the positive spillovers it generated that created the real incentives for
private firms to engage in the most effective private voluntary initiatives . . . ").
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their suppliers as cogs in the manufacturing machine.1 11 To put it
differently, what we need more of are buyers that are willing to invest
in building their suppliers' capabilities so that they can be socially
responsible in the long run:
Capability-building programs envision a mutually
reinforcing cycle in which more efficient plants invest in
their workers and that these more skilled and
empowered employees, in turn, promote continuous
improvement
processes
throughout
the factory,
rendering these facilities more and more efficient and
therefore more capable of producing high-quality goods
on time, at cost, in the quantities desired by ever-more
demanding customers, while at the same time respecting
corporate codes of conduct.112
It is this sense of a collective undertaking and working togetherness
that this contribution posits as the prerequisites for modifying corporate
behavior. 113 Rather than punishing suppliers even further for their
failures or magically expecting them to offer unrealistically low prices
while being in full compliance to their codes of conduct, the buyers must
do more.
1. Auditors as Consultants Rather than Inspectors
Building this type of a relationship takes time and a significant
amount of trust in an otherwise cutthroat business environment where
buyers uproot and move entire operations from a supplier in one
country to another, all to shed a few pennies. What is necessary in the
end is a shift in management thinking and for the buyers to see their
suppliers and their workers as assets, as something to be invested in in
order to build trusting, collaborative relationships with shared goals
and a common sense of purpose. 114 Labor exploitations of marginalized
workers in the global supply chain can indeed be reduced, but only if the

111. See generally THOMAS NAGEL, THE VIEW FROM NOWHERE (1986) (discussing how
human beings can consider the world from a "bird's-eye view" or an "agent-neutral role,"
that is, a different vantage point than their own experiences).
112. LOCKE, supra note 1, at 78.
113. See TOMASELLO, supra note 43, at 41, 57 (continuing to stress that there is "a
uniquely human sense of 'we,"' which is a "sense of shared intentionality").
114. See Locke et al., supra note 18, at 13; see also Stephen J. Frenkel & Duncan Scott,
Compliance, Collaboration,and Codes of Labor Practice:The Adidas Connection, 45 CAL.
MGMT. REV. 29, 44-45 (2002).
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"global buyers and their suppliers establish long-term, mutually
beneficial relations and when various public (authoritative rule-making)
institutions help to both support these mutually beneficial buyersupplier relations and resolve a set of collective action problems that
private actors cannot overcome on their own."115 We need companies to
not just say that they are being socially responsible or that they are
trying by way of a corporate code, but to actually be more hands on with
their suppliers.11 6 In this sense, the buyers need to act more as
consultants rather than inspectors.117
2. What the Consumers Can Do
In order to make the relationship between buyers and suppliers
more collaborative, it becomes necessary for the consumers and other
private actors to give these businesses some leeway as well. If
consumers and NGOs were to enforce otherwise voluntary corporate
codes by relying on various private law instruments in all instances, the
risk is that the opportunity for the buyers and the suppliers to build
mutually beneficial, collaborative relationships could be eroded. In
addition, when consumers become watchdogs, which is not necessarily a
bad thing in and of itself, there are possible spillovers as evidenced by
cases such as Kasky and Lid1. For example, targeting companies that
have corporate codes might create a perverse incentive problem of
watchdogs going after companies that are actually attempting to be
socially responsible, rather than targeting companies that do not care at
all about being socially responsible. The point to be taken away here is
that threats of legal sanction, while still an integral part of compliance,
must be considered "more as a background condition or fallback
mechanism, aimed at 'fostering' the joint problem-solving initiatives ...
."118 To simply add more and more legal norms in the hopes of
compelling companies to follow their corporate codes would only push us
past and down the apex of the inverted-U curve.
CONCLUSION

115. LOCKE, supra note 1, at 17.
116. See Frenkel & Scott, supra note 114, at 39.
117. See LOCKE, supra note 1, at 181 (suggesting that "[r]ather than act as 'inspectors'
whose job focused primarily on uncovering Code of Conduct violations and punishing
management for these infractions, these auditors acted more like consultants by engaging
in joint problem solving, information sharing, and the diffusion of best practices that were
in the mutual self-interest of the suppliers and aligned with the policies of global buyers").
118. Id. at 86.
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This contribution started with the realization that public law cannot
adequately deal with the problem of labor exploitation in the global
supply chain, thus requiring the assistance from various private actors.
The question presented in the introduction was to what extent private
regulatory efforts ought to be backed by private law mechanisms and
whether it would be desirable to convert otherwise voluntary codes of
conduct into something legally binding. In an attempt to raise some
concerns about "legalizing" codes of conduct in such a manner, Section I
distinguished intrinsic incentives from extrinsic incentives and argued
that intrinsic incentives were the prerequisites for making meaningful
changes sustainable in the long run. To further validate the risk of
taking corporate codes too seriously, Section II discussed how legalizing
codes of conduct could lead to the crowding out of intrinsic motivations
or how it could perversely incentivize companies to be reluctant about
implementing a CSR framework for the fear of additional litigation. In
light of these realizations, Section III suggested that rather than taking
corporate codes too seriously and relying on threats of legal sanctions to
make companies comply with their voluntary codes of conduct, the
companies ought to try a more collaborative approach that focuses on
social norms rather than legal norms. This was because in a number of
situations actors often complied with social norms better than with legal
norms and because social norms were more conducive to creating and
fostering intrinsic incentives. Clearly, there is a dire need for public law
to be better enforced, especially in the international context. While
private actors are capable of using private law to emulate government
regulators by auditing, monitoring, and sanctioning companies for
breaching codes of conduct, the suggestion made in this contribution is
that they should only do so strategically and after taking into
consideration the possible repercussions. The consumers and the
watchdogs should approach this issue by enabling the companies to take
these extra steps, rather than by adding extra layers of extrinsic
pressures, which could prove to be counterproductive in the long run.

